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Scientiﬁc naturalism and the neurology of
religious experience
MATTHEW RATCLIFFE
Department of Philosophy, University of Durham, 50, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HN
Abstract: In this paper, I consider V. S. Ramachandran’s in-principle agnosticism
concerning whether neurological studies of religious experience can be taken as
support for the claim that God really does communicate with people during
religious experiences. Contra Ramachandran, I argue that it is by no means obvious
that agnosticism is the proper scientiﬁc attitude to adopt in relation to this claim.
I go on to show how the questions of whether it is (1) a scientiﬁcally testable claim
and (2) a plausible hypothesis, serve to open up some important philosophical
issues concerning interpretive backgrounds that are presupposed in the assessment
of scientiﬁc hypotheses. More speciﬁcally, I argue that naturalism or scientiﬁc
objectivism in its various forms is not simply a neutral or default methodological
backdrop for empirical inquiry but involves acceptance of a speciﬁc ontology,
which functions as an implicit and unargued constitutive commitment. Hence,
these neurological studies can be employed as a lever with which to disclose
something of the ways in which diﬀerent frameworks of interpretation, both theistic
and atheistic, serve diﬀerently to structure and give meaning to empirical ﬁndings.
Introduction
Following a talk entitled ‘The neural basis of religious experience’, pres-
ented by V. S. Ramachandran and colleagues at a conference of the Society
for Neuroscience in October 1997, the alleged discovery of a ‘God-spot’ or
‘God-module’ in the brain has received much media attention, largely due
to its potential ramiﬁcations for our understanding of religious belief.1 In this
essay, I will begin by brieﬂy outlining what Ramachandran’s study2 purports
to show. I will then examine its possible implications for the claim that God
really does communicate with people during religious experiences. Contrary to
Ramachandran’s own view, I will argue that an in-principle agnosticism is not a
sustainable position to adopt in relation to this claim. A refusal to entertain the
possibility that God speaks to people during religious experiences as an aspect of
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scientiﬁc deliberation does not amount to neutrality. In fact, it ultimately entails
an ontological rather than merely methodological position, a position that
implicitly rules out the possibility of certain coherent, theistic ontological claims.
Hence, my purpose here is not to decide whether such studies do or do not
constitute evidence that religious experiences have veridical objects but rather
to employ them as a speciﬁc illustration of how a supposedly neutral method-
ological standpoint can commit one to an ontological position antagonistic to a
substantial body of religious beliefs. My argument complements concerns voiced
by Alvin Plantinga on a number of occasions (e.g. 1991/1998) to the eﬀect that
methodological exclusion of theistic claims in science often amounts to an
unwarranted ontological exclusion.
I will conclude by illustrating that the plausibility of claims such as there are
neurological structures for communicating with God cannot be weighed up in
a wholly empirical fashion. This is because pre-existent ontological commit-
ments, whether theistic or atheistic, serve as backdrops for the interpretation and
even individuation of biological structures, diﬀerently determining the kinds of
biological entities whose being one is prepared to acknowledge as a possibility.
Thus, if debate over the question is to be possible, it must involve an interplay
between empirical and hermeneutic considerations.
Ramachandran on the neurology of religious experience
It has long been known that certain subjects aﬀected by focal temporal-
lobe epilepsy report profound religious feelings during seizures, feelings that may
persist, with a lesser degree of intensity, after seizures have ceased.3 As Rama-
chandran notes, subjects with seizures ‘originating in this part of the brain can
have intense, spiritual experiences during the seizures and sometimes become
preoccupied with religious and moral issues even during seizure-free or interictal
periods’ (1998, 175).4 But how can one explain ‘the ﬂights of intense religious
ecstasy experienced by patients with temporal lobe seizures or their claim that
God speaks directly to them?’ (1998, 176). One might be tempted to dismiss such
experiences as a pathological eﬀect or malfunction speciﬁc to a certain neuro-
logical condition. However, experiments carried out by Michael Persinger with a
transcranial magnetic stimulator (discussed by Ramachandran (1998, 174–175))
cast doubt upon this. Magnetic stimulation of parts of the brain can induce
various psychological and behavioural eﬀects, some of which are uniquely as-
sociated with stimulation of quite speciﬁc brain areas, thus providing clues about
the possible localization of certain brain functions. When stimulating parts of his
temporal lobes, Persinger apparently ‘found to his amazement that he experi-
enced God for the ﬁrst time in his life’ (Ramachandran, 1998, 175). This possibility
of producing similar psychological eﬀects in subjects with no history of temporal-
lobe seizures suggests that the capacity for these experiences is not restricted to
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certain epileptics but is much more general or even universal, even though it is
considerably more pronounced in some people. So it seems that there is a com-
mon but variably active neurological structure involved in religious experience,
whose activity might be explained in a number of diﬀerent ways.
Ramachandran (1998, 181–182) entertains four possibilities :
(1) God really does speak to people during focal temporal-lobe seizures.
(2) Religious experiences are a misinterpretation or ad-hoc
rationalization of emotional chaos.
(3) Religious experiences are a result of general enhancement of neural
pathways between the limbic system and temporal lobe, resulting
in patients imbuing everything with excessive signiﬁcance.5
(4) Specialized neural circuitry mediates speciﬁcally religious
experience.
Ramachandran dismisses (1) on the basis that it ‘can be neither proved nor ruled
out on empirical grounds’ (1998, 182). He also dismisses (2), given that there are
myriad cases of emotional chaos that aren’t interpreted religiously. Hence the
two main contenders are (3) and (4). The media attention surrounding Rama-
chandran et al.’s 1997 presentation and 1998 report relates to the results of an
experiment set up to test the relative plausibility of these two explanations. Rama-
chandran et al. measured galvanic skin responses of two temporal-lobe patients
in order to monitor their emotional reactions to various words and icons, some
with strong religious associations, some mundane, and others non-religious but
generally perceived as emotive. Hypothesis (3) predicts enhanced emotional
reactions across the board. However, Ramachandran et al. found a selectively
enhanced response only to religious words and icons in temporal-lobe patients.
In conjunction with this, compared with other subjects there was a diminished
sensitivity to other emotive categories such as sexual imagery (see Ramachan-
dran, 1998, 185–188). Selective response to religious words and imagery rules out
(3), leaving only (4). Hence Ramachandran states that ‘the one clear conclusion
that emerges from all this is that there are circuits in the human brain that are
involved in religious experience and that these become hyperactive in some
epileptics’ (1998, 188).
It is important to note that this is a very modest conclusion and fails to diﬀer-
entiate a number of more speciﬁc claims. For example, the involvement of
common neurological structures does not entail that those structures have the
function of sub-serving religious experience. Religious experience could just as
well be a malfunction or a contingent side eﬀect of a diﬀerent function with
which these structures are involved. It is also by no means certain that the neural
pathways identiﬁed constitute a distinct and complete circuit, rather than a part
of a larger system that cannot be fruitfully considered in isolation from that
system.6 By analogy, a tennis player’s hands make a major contribution to her
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tennis-playing ability, and their absence would probably put paid to her sporting
career, but it would be a mistake to infer that the hands constitute a distinct
and complete tennis system that can be studied in isolation from the rest of the
organism. Furthermore, as Ramachandran (1998, 184) acknowledges, the exper-
imental results do not imply that religious experience is in any illuminating sense
biological. Speciﬁc biological structures are involved in writing books, kicking
balls, and smoking cigarettes but this does not imply that such pastimes are
written into our biology. So Ramachandran’s results are still a long way from
suggesting a ‘God-module’ ; that is, a discrete neurological structure whose
function is to produce or mediate religious experience.
Hence, a pressing goal for future research is to assess the many competing
hypotheses that remain viable. However, Ramachandran explicitly states that one
hypothesis not up for scientiﬁc debate is (1) that God really does speak to people
during temporal-lobe seizures. He claims that ‘this can be neither proved nor
ruled out on empirical grounds’ (1998, 182), and maintains that ‘my goal as a
scientist … is to discover how and why religious sentiments originate in the brain,
but this has no bearing one way or the other on whether God really exists or not’
(1998, 185). Hence, the position advocated in respect of the theistic hypothesis is
one of religious neutrality. Theistic claims are, it seems, excluded by deﬁnition
from the scope of science, which can investigate the brain structures involved in
religious experience without prejudicing one way or the other the claim that God
really interacts with people during religious experiences.
Plantinga (e.g. 1991/1998, 1997) claims that this sort of methodological natural-
ism often, though not always, involves a kind of ontological commitment, a
provisional atheism rather than religious neutrality :
We are sometimes told that natural science is natural science. So far it is hard to
object: but how shall we take the term ‘natural’ here? It could mean that natural
science is science devoted to the study of nature. Fair enough. But it is also taken to
mean that natural science involves a methodological naturalism or provisional
atheism: no hypothesis according to which God has done this or that can qualify as
a scientiﬁc hypothesis. (1991/1998, 693)
According to Plantinga (1991/1998, 694), methodological naturalism slides into a
‘sober [atheistic] metaphysical truth’ which is ‘settled and fundamental ’.
McMullin argues in response to Plantinga, that ‘methodological naturalism does
not restrict our study of nature; it just lays down which sort of study qualiﬁes as
‘‘scientiﬁc’’ ’ (1993/1998, 702). He contends that scientiﬁc theorizing is simply not
the kind of activity that can entertain claims concerning God’s agency, but that
this is just a methodological restriction that serves to determine the scope and
limits of science. In other words, the restriction is part of the deﬁnition of science
and does not entail any ontological claims. Though speciﬁc scientiﬁc hypotheses
can come into conﬂict with religious doctrine, there is no sense in which meth-
odological naturalism is itself a source of conﬂict. Science does not rule out
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theistic claims a priori but leaves them outside its scope, to be legitimately
entertained elsewhere:
Scientists have to proceed in this way; the methodology of natural science gives no
purchase on the claim that a particular event or type of event is to be explained by
invoking God’s ‘special’ action or by calling on the testimony of Scripture. Calling
this methodological naturalism is simply a way of drawing attention to the fact that
it is a way of characterizing a particular methodology, no more. In particular, it is
not an ontological claim about what sort of agency is or is not possible. (Plantinga
(1993/1998, 702))
Ruse argues similarly that,
… the metaphysical naturalist is the person who is an atheist, who does deny that there
is anything beyond blind law working on inert matter. The methodological naturalist,
who may well be an ardent Darwinian, is one who states that for the purposes of doing
science nothing but law will be entertained, but who recognizes that there might be
more, in fact or meaning. (2001, 99)
The disagreement between Plantinga and McMullin is explicitly concerned
with the question of Darwinian evolution versus Biblical Special Creation and
whether, as Plantinga maintains, methodological naturalism functions as a
background of ontological presuppositions relative to which Special Creation
is rendered untenable. According to Plantinga, it is a background that the theist
should not feel compelled to accept. Unlike Plantinga, I assume the truth of some
account of biological evolution, and I also accept that natural selection is an
important source of evolutionary change. However, I will argue in what follows
that methodological naturalism, construed as a deﬁnitive refusal to entertain
theistic possibilities in a scientiﬁc context, itself entails ontological claims that are
antagonistic to theism. Hence, contrary to McMullin’s claim that methodological
naturalism does not amount to ‘an ontological claim about what sort of agency is
or is not possible’, I will argue that it does sometimes entail such commitments. In
what follows, I will focus on the claim that God communicates with people during
religious experiences. I will show that refusal to entertain this theistic hypothesis
as an integral aspect of scientiﬁc inquiry into the neural basis of religious
experience ultimately entails a denial of the veridicality of religious experience.
The contents of religious experience
In order to argue that supposedly neutral, methodological naturalism in
relation to the neurology of religious experience actually involves the denial of the
ontological claim that God communicates with people through religious experi-
ence, one must ﬁrst give some indication of what this claim involves. What is
meant by a ‘religious experience’ and by the ‘object’ of such an experience?
What common experience can be said to unify the category ‘religious’ and what
elements, if any, do all religious experiences incorporate? Reports of religious
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experiences are culturally and historically extremely diverse. Not only do religious
experiences involve a vast diversity of elements but many of these elements are
exclusive to only certain doctrines and may be incompatible with the central
tenets of other doctrines. Hence in order to extract elements common to all, many
features must be regarded as inessential.
In addressing the question of whether there is a common core underlying all
religious experiences, it is instructive to turn to William James’s classic discussion
in The Varieties of Religious Experience. James surveys a plethora of diﬀerent
kinds of religious experience and argues that, in order to extract that which is
shared by and essential to all, one has to subordinate the intellectual aspect of the
experience to a more basic feeling :
Individuality is founded in feeling; and the recesses of feeling, the darker, blinder
strata of character, are the only places in the world in which we catch real fact in
the making, and directly perceive how events happen, and how work is actually
done. Compared with this world of living, individualized feelings, the world of
generalized objects which the intellect contemplates is in fact without solidity
or life. (1902, 501–502)
Cultural and historical variation in the contents of religious experiences arises,
according to James, from the secondary imposition of over-beliefs, culturally
diverse intellectualizations that diﬀerently interpret a common experience (1902,
504). The underlying feelings, however, constitute a universal experiential
‘nucleus’. This nucleus takes the form of an initial sense of general unease, or un-
homeliness, that is subsequently resolved through the feeling of a higher power
with which one comes to connect or bond (1902, 507). The contents of this core
experience do not conform exclusively to any speciﬁc religious doctrine. In fact,
as James admits, they are so generic as to accommodate the imposition of either
monotheistic or polytheistic over-beliefs. However, he qualiﬁes this by saying
that ‘God is the natural appellation, for us Christians at least, for the supreme
reality, so I will call this higher part of the universe by the name of God’ (1902,
516). James’s discussion thus suggests a common content of religious experiences
that can be described as a feeling of some higher power which infuses one’s world
with meaning. This core experience does not conform exclusively to the speciﬁcs
of any one religious doctrine. As Mackie (1982, 183) puts it, the most that such
experiences can assure us of is ‘ the existence of some greater friendly power,
whose precise identity and character are left wholly indeterminate’.
But should the feeling of communion with a higher being be regarded as real or
illusory? James contends that religious experience does indeed point to a genuine
reality beyond the mundane, physical, objective world, to a higher power with
which the experiencer really does communicate. But his argument in support of
this, that the world of religious experience aﬀects our actions and anything that
aﬀects our actions must be real (1902, 516), is implausible, given that illusions and
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hallucinations can also have a real inﬂuence upon our actions.7 However, James’s
description of the content of the experience does constitute a plausible account
of the essential elements of religious experience, if not a compelling argument
for the reality of its object. And this account ﬁts in very nicely with the
experiences reported by Ramachandran’s subjects. Ramachandran describes how
focal temporal-lobe seizures can induce ‘deeply moving spiritual experiences,
including a feeling of divine presence and the sense that they are in direct com-
munion with God. Everything around them is imbued with cosmic signiﬁcance’
(1998, 179). The experience, as with James’s descriptions, seems to involve two
elements, a feeling of communion with a higher being and an infusion of life with
a new sense of meaning. James and Ramachandran also agree with respect to the
centrality of emotion to religious experience. James not only acknowledges the
primacy of emotion but also accepts that feelings can constitute a legitimate
guide to aspects of reality that are missed by commonplace intellectualizations.
The importance of emotion as a constituent of one’s cognition of and basic
orientation towards the world is readily apparent in Ramachandran’s work (see
1998, chs 7, 8, 9). It is also explicit in Damasio’s recent neurological studies
of emotion (1995, 2000). On the basis of such studies, it is not implausible to
maintain that emotions can play an important role in revealing the world rather
than merely obfuscating our intellectualization of things. Thus, the emotional
foundation of religious experience does not in itself amount to a compelling
reason for dismissing its object as illusory.8
So, in considering the veridicality of religious experience, the possibility one is
required to entertain is that God is communicating with the subject in some
broad sense. According to James, this generic feeling is the source of all religion.
Hence a denial of its object, in conjunction with a realist understanding of
religious belief, would amount to atheism. However, it is clear that, even if
such experiences are not the sole source of and motivation for religious belief,
they play a major role in many, if not all, religions. So a global denial of their
veridicality would amount to an ontological claim that is, if not synonymous with
atheism, at least antagonistic to theism. In the next section I will show that
‘methodological ’ naturalism entails just such a denial.
Explaining the neurology of religious experience: methodology
and ontology
In postulating a common neural basis for religious experience, Rama-
chandran’s studies support James’s claim that it is a unitary phenomenon, rather
than an arbitrary categorization of disparate, culturally diverse, and ultimately
dissimilar experiences. If methodological naturalism or scientiﬁc agnosticism
concerning the experiential object is defensible and sustainable, then there is no
subsequent scientiﬁc question of whether these experiences have a genuine
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object or whether they are illusory or mistaken. But howmight one obtain a more
speciﬁc scientiﬁc explanation of how, and why, certain parts of the brain are
involved in the production of religious experience? Ramachandran emphasizes
the importance of an evolutionary explanation and states that, in order to obtain
a comprehensive understanding of the mechanisms involved, the question one
has to address is ‘what sorts of Darwinian selection pressures could lead to such a
mechanism?’ (1998, 183).
One conceivable evolutionary explanation of the capacity for religious experi-
ence is that a speciﬁc neural structure (A) has the function of producing religious
experiences (x). ‘A has function x ’ is generally taken to mean something like
(1) A consistently has eﬀect x, and (2) A came to exist or continues to exist in its
current form because it does x. In other words, selection pressures that favoured
the ability to do x have shaped the development of A.9 A broadly functional or
adaptationist account of any A’s capacity to x can accommodate a number of
diﬀerent historical scenarios.
(1) A exists in its current form as a result of long-term selection pressures that
incrementally shaped it so as to better perform x and only x. Hence x is currently
the sole function of A and has been for some considerable time.
(2) A originally arose due to selection pressures that shaped it to perform task
y. However, the way it performed task y also made it coincidentally able to aid the
accomplishment of task x. During its more recent evolutionary history, ability to
perform task x took over as the primary selection pressure shaping devel-
opment of A. Hence, the current function of A is x, though its function was pre-
viously y and, in order to understand its structure, we must appreciate the role of
both x and y in shaping its evolution. To apply a term coined by Gould and Vrba
(1982), A’s performance of x is an exaptation, a role that it was not originally
selected for but which has more recently become the primary focus of selection
pressures on A.10
(3) A once had function x but its function is now y.
(4) A evolved as a result of its ability to perform task x or y and was then
shaped by natural selection as a result of its ability to perform the other task too.
It retains both functions.
(5) x is a current function of A but A had and still has a number of other
functions which have to be taken into consideration in order to understand why A
has its current form.
(6) x is a current function of structure B. A is part of B and is integral to B’s
capacity to x.11
All of the above involve some kind of adaptationist claim in respect of A’s
capacity to x. That is, selection pressures favouring the production of x have or
once had an inﬂuence on the genesis or persistence of structures of type A.
However, a number of other historical scenarios are also possible. That structure
A and eﬀect x are in some broad sense a product of selection does not imply
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that either A or x were themselves selected for. It is possible that (a) x is not
and never was a function of A, or even (b) that A itself has no function and
never had a function. The following accounts all incorporate either (a) or (b) or
both.
(1) y is a function of A but x is a malfunction to which A is disposed as a
consequence of its ability to perform y. In other words, x is not something A was
selected to do and x impairs either A’s or some other organismic structure’s
ability to perform its function.
(2) x is not and never was a function of A. It is a contingent eﬀect arising from
A’s being shaped by natural selection to carry out function y. For example, the
heart has the eﬀect of making a thumping noise, which is not a function of the
heart but a consequence of its pumping function. In such scenarios, x is not
a malfunction but a non-functional side eﬀect of another function. To adopt
Gould and Lewontin’s (1979) well-known term, x is a spandrel, a non-functional
eﬀect arising from selection pressures acting on a diﬀerent capacity.
(3) A has no function. A is itself a spandrel, entailing that any eﬀect x of A is
also a spandrel. Natural selection never acted directly upon A, and its genesis and
persistence can only be explained by treating it as a non-adaptive structural side
eﬀect of a greater adapted system.
(4) A facilitates x but x is not a biological capacity of A. Consider, for example,
using a knife and fork, doing crossword puzzles, and watching ﬁlms. For con-
venience, I treat ‘x is not a biological capacity of A’ as a subcategory of ‘x is a
spandrel’. Within this more general category, some spandrels are more suited to
biological explanations than others.
The above comprise a fairly comprehensive but highly simpliﬁed list of the
various possible evolutionary explanations of how a biological structure A and
one of its eﬀects x came about. They can be grouped into three more general
categories:
(1) x is or was a function of A.
(2) x is a malfunction of A.
(3) A/x has no function and never has had.
If this explanatory framework is applied to the neural pathways associated with
religious experience, it would seem that one of many possible coherent ex-
planations is (1) that certain structures in the temporal-lobe and limbic system
(A) have the function of facilitating religious experience (x), and that religious
experience is functional because it allows communication with God.12 (This is
more speciﬁc than ‘God communicates with people during religious experi-
ences’, as it is not inconceivable that God communicates with people, even
though they do not have specialized structures whose function is to facilitate such
communication.) Given that such an explanation seems perfectly coherent, why,
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one might ask, should it not be entertained as a scientiﬁc possibility? As Joseph
(2001, 132) notes of religious experiences and their various objects:
Why would the limbic system evolve specialized neurons or neural networks that
subserve the capacity to experience or hallucinate spirits, angels, and the souls of
the departed if these entities had no basis in reality? … Perhaps under the guiding
inﬂuence of ‘God’, or perhaps after repeated experiences with gods, spirits, demons,
angels, and lost souls, homo sapiens evolved these neurons, which enabled them to
better cope with the unknown as well as to perceive and respond to spiritual
messages that increased likelihood of survival. A true scientist would not rule out
such a possibility.
Why is ‘the function of certain structures is to aid communication with God’ not
a respectable hypothesis? Ramachandran claims that it ‘can neither be proved
nor ruled out on empirical grounds’ (1998, 182), implying that empirical ﬁndings
can have no bearing whatsoever on whether religious experience has a genuine
object or not. Whichever explanation of A and its eﬀect x we settle on, evol-
utionary explanation of religious experience will, according to Ramachandran,
have no implications so far as the reality of its object is concerned.
However, a cursory glance at the possible evolutionary explanations of A and x
suggests that this is not the case at all. For example, suppose one claims (2) that
structure A evolved due to its ability to perform task y and that its current struc-
ture can be comprehensively accounted for in relation to task y. When structure A
is involved in religious experience (x), its ability to perform y is detrimentally
aﬀected. It is also apparent from further study that any structure able to perform y
will as a consequence be susceptible to certain forms of disturbance, damage, or
developmental anomaly that will result in eﬀect x. It turns out that x has no bio-
logically advantageous eﬀect and is almost invariably damaging to the organism.
Thus, it seems reasonable to infer that x is a malfunction of A. If x is a malfunction
of A, then this automatically rules out the possibility that x is a function of A. And
if scientiﬁc explanations can rule out a hypothesis, it is surely mistaken to claim
that they can have no bearing on the probability of that hypothesis.
A malfunction explanation not only rules out the claim that religious experi-
ence is a function of A, but also casts doubt on the more general claim that such
experiences have a real object. If the experience is a malfunction then it is
something that has gone wrong and any experiential object arising from cognitive
malfunction is presumably to be treated with incredulity, just as the objects of
experiences resulting from the ingestion of drugs that distort normal cortical func-
tion are generally taken not to exist. There is no reason for anyone, including the
experiential subject, to assume the veridicality of an experience that results from
cognitive processes that are by deﬁnition unreliable.
When it comes to empirical assessment of a malfunction hypothesis, thematter
is less than clear. Ramachandran considers the question of whether religious
experience is a result of a malfunction, noting of one subject that ‘he was intense
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and self-absorbed and had the arrogance of a believer but none of the humility of
the deeply religious’ (1998, 180). However, he also observes that these experiences
are not obviously detrimental to a subject’s wellbeing. Indeed, the subject herself
often ﬁnds the experience highly desirable. Hence, Ramachandran remarks that
‘the physician has no right, really, to attribute a value label to such esoteric
embellishments of personality. On what basis does one decide whether a mystical
experience is normal or abnormal?’ (1998, 184). But such ambiguity does not
amount to a suﬃcient reason for claiming in-principle undecidability. After all,
many evolutionary explanations are to some extent speculative and, despite the
ambiguity as to whether religious experience amounts to an obvious impairment,
appeal to historical selection processes could conceivably help to resolve the
issue in respect of malfunction.
So we can see how the malfunction hypothesis excludes the possibility that the
function of A is to communicate with God and also how this would in turn cast
doubt upon the more general claim that God is really present during religious
experiences. A similar argument can be played out in relation to versions of claim
(3) that religious experience is a spandrel, as opposed to a malfunction. Suppose
that neural structure A is a part of a greater structure B, which historically evolved
to perform a complex and intricate set of functions. It turns out that an un-
avoidable structural consequence of B’s ability to perform functions v, w, y, and z
is A, which is not itself and never has been the object of selection pressures.
However, it turns out that B couldn’t arise without producing A as a side eﬀect. An
unavoidable consequence of A’s structure is that it sometimes induces a certain
kind of experience that is neither obviously advantageous nor disadvantageous
to the organism. Again, such a hypothesis is diﬃcult to corroborate convincingly,
but concerns about the availability and adequacy of evidence plague many
such evolutionary explanations and it is not clear that this case is qualitatively
diﬀerent.
As in the malfunction case, a spandrel explanation rules out the possibility that
the structure’s function is to talk to God, as spandrels are, by deﬁnition, structures
that don’t have functions. And like the malfunction explanation, a spandrel
scenario casts doubt upon the more general claim that religious experience has a
real object. If A is a spandrel, then its genesis, persistence, and various eﬀects,
such as x, can be wholly accounted for independent of any environmental inﬂu-
ences that directly inﬂuenced the tendency to x. Spandrels do not systematically
relate to the environment in any way that has historically had adaptive conse-
quences for the organism. Otherwise, selection pressures would no doubt have
inﬂuenced their genesis, persistence, and causal properties, and so an adap-
tationist account would constitute a partial explanation of their being, implying
that they were not spandrels at all. If religious experience is an eﬀect x of a
spandrel A, any reference to an environmental cause that has shaped A’s tend-
ency to produce eﬀect x is ruled out, whether that cause be the communicative
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acts of God or anything else. A’s disposition to x is wholly explicable in terms of
selection pressures acting on some other organismic capacity, with A and x
emerging as contingent side eﬀects of functional capacities to which they make
no contribution. So, if religious experience is a spandrel in the strictest sense, its
having a genuine object is ruled out by deﬁnition, as no such object has played a
historical role in the causal genesis of the experience, and if it plays no such role,
it cannot be in communion with the experiencer.
These examples show that empirical considerations are relevant to an assess-
ment of the claim that the function of A is to talk to God and also to the more
general question of the veridicality of religious experience. However, one might
object that methodological naturalism does not deny the possibility of conﬂict
between speciﬁc scientiﬁc hypotheses and certain theistic claims, so, contra
Ramachandran, perhaps properly methodological agnosticism only arises in the
ﬁrst type of case, where religious experience is taken to be a function of A. Any
adaptive eﬀects of religious experience could arguably be explained just as well
without invoking the presence of God as a contributing factor as, whether its
object is real or illusory, the eﬀects of religious experience will be the same and
the following two hypotheses will be scientiﬁcally indistinguishable:
(1) Structure A has the function of inducing a feeling of God’s
presence and this has adaptive consequences.
(2) Structure A has the function of inducing a feeling of God’s
presence and this has adaptive consequences and God exists.
Scientiﬁc agnosticism is unavoidably entailed if there is no way that (1) and (2)
can be empirically distinguished, and it might seem that ‘God exists ’ is a spuri-
ous additional proposition that can, in the context of scientiﬁc inquiry, be re-
moved for simplicity’s sake without any empirical ramiﬁcations. However, this is
misleading. Consider as an analogy ‘Perceptual systems have the function of
producing a mental map of the world and the world exists’. An evolutionary
explanation of the function of perceptual systems that did not presuppose the
existence of the world would have to do an awful lot more work in order to explain
the function of perceptual systems, even though there is no absolutely conclusive
way of deciding between the two alternatives, as several hundred years of philo-
sophical scepticism concerning the external world illustrates. Surely the same
reasoning applies to religious experience, thus allowing for the possibility that the
most plausible evolutionary explanation is one that actually invokes God as a
being with whom communication carries some evolutionary advantage. Why not,
as James suggests, take religious experiences to be veridical? Indeed, why not take
a biological adaptation for talking with God as one’s initial hypothesis rather than
exclude it a priori from consideration?
However, even if this hypothesis is, for some reason, excluded from scientiﬁc
consideration, it could still be argued that a scientiﬁc functional explanation of
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A’s capacity to x might involve assigning a function that is at least compatible
with the claims that (a) God is present during certain experiences, and (b) a
function of certain neural structures is to facilitate such communication. And if
there is no unavoidable ontological incompatibility between methodological
naturalism and such theistic claims, then naturalism is agnostic rather than
atheistic in its refusal to address the question. Contrary to such a position, I
suggest that even this minimal compatibility is illusory. In other words, refusal
to entertain (b) as a possible scientiﬁc explanation ultimately rules out both (a)
and (b).
Consider ‘Structure A has the function of inducing experience of God and this
has adaptive consequences because ‘‘God exists’’ ’. By replacing ‘and’ with ‘be-
cause’, we can see how God’s existence constitutes not a spurious additional
proposition but an explanation of why A’s doing x has an adaptive eﬀect. God is
singled out as the environmental cause of the experience, the environmental in-
ﬂuence that was instrumental in the historical shaping of structure A’s capacity
to produce eﬀect x, just as light is causally instrumental in the evolution of eyes.
Refusal to entertain the possibility that the function of a structure really is to
communicate with God eﬀectively amounts to a refusal to consider the possibility
that God, as part of the selective environment in which organisms evolve, could at
any time have had any causal inﬂuence on the genesis of a structure or upon
its tendency to produce certain eﬀects. Thus, God could have no inﬂuence on
the evolution of a capacity for religious experience. If an explanation of re-
ligious experience rules out the causal eﬃcacy of God in producing the experi-
ence, this immediately denies any warrant for claiming that God, as the object of
religious experience, is real. If God has no causal eﬃcacy in relation to religious
experience then communion with God is simply not a real part of the experience.
What may at ﬁrst seem like agnosticism ultimately amounts to denial.
Consider the following:
(1) Structure A has the function of producing religious experiences
and this has adaptive consequences because such experiences
strengthen social bonding.
(2) Structure A has the function of facilitating religious experiences
and this has adaptive consequences because God exists.
These could be rendered compatible by maintaining that communication with
God enables social bonding. However, if one refuses to consider (2) as a scientiﬁc
possibility, then such compatibilism is by implication also ruled out as a scientiﬁc
possibility. If (1) without (2) is an incomplete explanation, in the same sense that
‘the function of the visual system is to produce the experience of a visual world’ is
incomplete without the additional claim that this function is eﬃcacious because
the world exists, then there can be no justiﬁcation for excluding (2) and settling
for an incomplete explanation. If God is the primary historical environmental
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cause of the evolution of structure A and its eﬀect x, then functional explanation
of A and x should refer to God, just as water must be invoked in order to explain
the development of ﬁns, their function being to ‘ﬂap’ constituting a horribly
uninformative explanation. The alternative is to maintain that something like (1)
amounts to a comprehensive scientiﬁc explanation of the causal forces operating
in the selective environment of A and thus a comprehensive account of all causes
relevant to A’s performance of function x, with the result that God is allocated no
causal role whatsoever and so any sense of communion with God is illusory. Of
course, one might contend that God’s inﬂuence is not necessarily ‘causal’, in the
usual sense of the term, but may involve a very diﬀerent medium to that of
physical causation. However, insofar as such an inﬂuence would still produce a
genuine eﬀect in the subject, denial of physical causation could just as well be
construed as a reason not to reject God as a real feature of the selective en-
vironment, but to reconsider one’s ontology and embrace more than simply
physical causation. A rejection of such inﬂuences would, in any case, constitute
an ontological rather than a methodological restriction which, if there are non-
causal inﬂuences resulting in organismic eﬀects, amounts to an ontologically
incomplete picture of the world.
Refusal to consider the possibility that the function of religious experience is to
communicate with God is ultimately equivalent to a denial that God, as a part of
the organismic environment in which natural selection operates, could in any
way causally inﬂuence the genesis of biological structures and their eﬀects. If
religious experience is to be explained biologically, the result is a denial that such
experiences have a real object, at least if one accepts an epistemology according
to which an x’s having some eﬀect upon a subject is a necessary condition for
that subject’s having any grounds for believing in the reality of x. One way out of
this is to postulate a two-tier model of functions, where something can have
function y in the context of biology but function x in the context of religious
discussion, resulting in two distinct but somehow harmonious universes of dis-
course. However, if a biological account purports in any way to investigate or
explain speciﬁcally religious experience, then the two universes have already
collided. If everything belonging to the category of religious experience and re-
ligion more generally is excluded from science, then the problem can’t arise to
begin with, as talk of a neural structure associated with religious experience
would be disallowed. Though such a division of worlds might put paid to dis-
cussions like this one, it would also involve a strict compartmentalization of
human life that would most likely be unacceptable to most and also almost
impossible to sustain.
To summarize, methodological naturalism (construed as the refusal to con-
sider any hypothesis that makes reference to God’s existence), coupled with the
application of a fairly standard framework for evolutionary explanation,
unavoidably translates into an ontological exclusion when applied to the
336 MATTHEW RATCL I FFE
hypothesis : ‘ the function of A is to communicate with God’. Hence, it involves
a form of ontological commitment that is antithetical to any religious doctrine
ascribing some degree of importance to veridical religious experience.
Interpretation and constitutive commitment
In the preceding section I discussed the issue of the neural basis of
religious experience as though it were in principle resolvable in a wholly empiri-
cal fashion, naturalism amounting to the exclusion of one empirical scenario.
However, things are not so simple, and in this section I will argue that ‘method-
ological ’ naturalism is an ontological commitment that is in an important sense
prior to empirical considerations. That is, it serves as a pre-theoretical back-
ground of interpretation that determines the kinds of things one is prepared to
admit into being.
My reason for focusing speciﬁcally on the neurology of religious experience as a
philosophical case study is that it serves to illustrate a robust ontological assump-
tion that would pass unnoticed in the majority of selectionist explanations. Thus
my argument is not an extended tirade against a few remarks made by Rama-
chandran, but an attempt to bring to the foreground a much more general point
concerning ontological presuppositions underlying any so-calledmethodological
naturalism. In order to develop this point more fully, it is important to under-
stand why the neurology of religious experience is of special interest.
In many circumstances, assignment of function does seem religiously neutral.
Darwin replaced instantaneous special creation by God with evolution via natural
selection as the proximal mechanism of biological adaptation. However, this does
not rule out God as the ultimate source, acting through the various evolutionary
mechanisms to create organisms. Such a simplistic conception of compatibility is
not without its problems (see e.g. Ruse (2001)). However, the crucial point is that
the function of a biological structure can be the same whether or not one chooses
to invoke God as the ultimate source of biological ‘design’. Consider a simple
case such as ‘the function of the eye is to see’, or ‘the function of the hand is to
grasp objects’. Whether God exists or not will not, it would seem, aﬀect function
assignments in such cases and, similarly, assigned functions will have no bearing
on the claim that God exists. Thus, though it is by no means clear that science
should remain neutral on the question of whether God is the ultimate agency
behind the genesis of the biological world, it does appear that agnosticism is a
generally tenable position so far as the ultimate source of biological adaptation is
concerned.
However, in the case of the neurology of religious experience, the situation is
very diﬀerent and this is because we are not being asked to consider whether God
is the ultimate agency behind the evolutionary process but whether God can be
The neurology of religious experience 337
taken as part of the selective environment in relation to which that process op-
erates upon organisms. If God is not a part of the selective environment to which
organisms are adapted by natural selection, then no part of any organism can
have a function involving God, as the kinds of function one is prepared to assign
depend on the kinds of thing one is prepared to admit as possible constituents of
the selective environment. For example, if ﬁsh were not part of any organismic
environment, no biological structure could have the function of perceiving,
evading, luring, catching, dismembering, digesting, or parasitizing ﬁsh. Thus, in
the case of the organismic environment in which selection acts, refusal to enter-
tain the possibility of God as an active part of the environment, able to aﬀect
organisms, results in an ontological restriction in relation to possible character-
istics of the biological world. Hence, the neurology of religious experience serves
as a thought-experiment with which to reveal a metaphysical commitment at-
tached to any exclusion of God from biological inquiry. This commitment
involves rejection of God as a part of the causally eﬃcacious environment in
which organisms evolve. If God exists, then God is not a part of the world in which
we live and act.
Such restrictions not only serve to constrain the kinds of functions one is pre-
pared to admit as a possibility but also the kinds of beings one is prepared to allow
as possible constituents of reality. This is because there are many cases where
functions are not just properties that are assigned to pre-given entities but rather
constitute those entities, making them what they are. This is readily apparent in
the case of artifacts such as can openers, screwdrivers and chairs. As Heidegger
remarks, ‘ the functionality that goes with chair, table, window is exactly that
which makes the thing what it is ’, (1982, ·15, 164). And it is equally true of many
biological entities. Consider a structure such as a wing, a hand, or a claw. The
individuation of such a structure makes essential reference to its function. Wings,
for instance, are individuated in terms of their functional role in relation to
ﬂight. Indeed Millikan (1984) and Neander (1991) have argued that biological
categories are invariably functional categories, a biological structure’s function
making it the thing that it is. However, this strong claim may well need to
be deﬂated. As Amundson and Lauder (1994) note, in criticizing Neander and
Millikan, biological structures are often classiﬁed phylogenetically, in terms
of anatomical homology, and it is by no means clear that such classiﬁcations
make essential reference to functions. For example, a pentadactyl limb is still
a pentadactyl limb, whatever its function may be. Nevertheless, it is safe to say
that a substantial proportion of biological entities are functionally individuated.
Thus, preconceptions concerning the nature of the environment that restrict
the range of possible functions one is prepared to entertain also restrict the range
of possible beings.
One consequence of this is that refusal to consider the claim that God is or was
an inﬂuential part of the selective environment entails a denial of the possibility
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of a ‘God module’, taken literally. This is because modules, as conceived
by evolutionary psychologists, are individuated functionally rather than anatom-
ically. As Pinker vividly puts it :
Mental modules are not likely to be visible to the naked eye as circumscribed territories
on the surface of the brain, like the ﬂank steak and the rump roast on the supermarket
cow display. A mental module probably looks more like a roadkill, sprawling messily
over the bulges and crevasses of the brain (1998, 30).
But if function x isn’t possible, then any structure whose individuation pre-
supposes the possibility of function x is also not possible. Thus a God module, a
functionally individuated structure whose function is to communicate in some
way with God, is impossible. Refusal to entertain the possibility of God as an
environmental inﬂuence, relative to which diﬀerent organismic responses have a
diﬀerential eﬀect in relation to organismic survival and reproduction, will simi-
larly rule out a whole range of entities. Preconceptions concerning what the
organismic environment contains act as an interpretive background relative to
which only certain entities and functions are deemed possible. So exclusion of
God as a part of that environment amounts to an ontological exclusion of myriad
conceivable beings.
In stark contrast to this Godless environment is Alvin Plantinga’s claim that
belief in God is properly basic for the believer. According to Plantinga, (e.g. 1981,
46–47), beliefs such as ‘God is speaking to me’, ‘God disapproves of what I have
done’, and ‘God forgives me’ are basic in the sense that ‘I see a tree’ is basic. That
is, the contents of such beliefs reﬂect an everyday experiential environment in
which God is always present for the believer and taken for granted in an anal-
ogous sense to the majority of everyday perceptual beliefs.
Such radically diﬀerent basic conceptions of what the world is like are clearly
not methodological constraints but contrasting ways of interpreting the world
that determine the kinds of beings one is willing to entertain as possible con-
stituents of reality. One’s conception of the environment serves as a background
from which one interprets the biological world so as to assign functions and indi-
viduate structures.Diﬀerentbackgroundcommitments concerningwhat theworld
is like will thus result in diﬀerent ontologies. The naturalist assumes that God is
in no way tangible. In so doing, she rules out God as a possible part of the en-
vironment, an environment that serves as a presuppositional interpretive back-
ground for the understanding of biological structures.
One might object that it is simply the case that we describe the environment
as carefully as we can and discover that God is not an eﬃcacious part of it. Hence
the methodological naturalist does not rule out God a priori but, after careful
empirical investigation, concludes that there is no evidence of such an environ-
mental inﬂuence, which is why it is not the subject of any empirically based
inquiry.
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A problem with this is that the nature of the selection-relevant environment is
not always readily apparent in the case of any given organism or organ. Adap-
tationist inquiries can go either of two ways:
(1) One lists some salient features of the environment in which x
evolved and considers whether x might have evolved as an
adaptive response to one or more of these features.13
(2) One hypothesizes that structure x is an adaptation and considers
the kind of environment that x might be or have been an adaptive
response to.14
In the case of (1), a description of the relevant environment is taken for granted.
However, in (2) the nature of the environment is itself a matter of debate, the
question being ‘what kinds of possible environmental inﬂuences are the most
plausible evolutionary causes of a structure like A?’ In practice, these two strands
of inquiry are often likely to be intertwined. Absolute inﬂexibility with respect to
the nature of the environment in which any structure evolved is likely to obfus-
cate inquiry by ruling out investigation of various possible functions, structures,
and historical scenarios.
So one might maintain that, in the case of religious experience, inﬂexible pre-
suppositions concerning the environment rule out the possibility of the very thing
that could constitute evidence of a novel environmental inﬂuence. That is, unless
we at least entertain the possibility that God is a part of the environment in which
evolution occurs, we will deny the possibility of any biological structure whose
existence might constitute evidence for such a claim. However, our naturalist
might reply that, although the selective environment relevant to any speciﬁc ex-
ample of biological adaptation is a matter of debate, there is a common taxonomy
of causally eﬃcacious environmental features from which the environment rel-
evant to any speciﬁc example of organismic adaptation is comprised. As God is
not a part of this taxonomy, God cannot be plausibly maintained as a possible
environmental inﬂuence on the genesis of biological structures.
But the contention that we have such a description of the environment is
dubious at best. When one tries to describe the objective way in which the world
most absolutely, fundamentally is, it becomes readily apparent that this is an
extremely diﬃcult undertaking. Nowhere is this better illustrated than in Hus-
serl’s (1970, II·9h, IIIA) discussion of the ‘life-world’ ; a tacit background of taken-
for-granted reality that is presupposed by naive objective conceptions of the way
things are; the ‘forgotten meaning-fundament of natural science’ (1970, ·9h, 48).
As Gurwitsch (1974, 17) explains, the concept of the life-world, as put forward by
Husserl and elaborated by Schutz, ‘ the life-world is deﬁned as comprising all
items and objects which present themselves in pre-scientiﬁc experience and as
they present themselves prior to their scientiﬁc interpretation in the modern
sense’. It is a world-disclosing foundation that has ‘been obscured, obfuscated,
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and forgotten’ and is consequently very diﬃcult to describe; a background pre-
supposed by all scientiﬁc abstractions, ‘whose simple acceptance proves an es-
sential precondition of every activity’ (1974, 144).
Husserl’s account of the life-world suggests that scientiﬁc conceptions of the
objective world presuppose various constitutive methods which abstract from the
pre-given life-world and, in so doing, diﬀerently determine the kinds of beings
one is prepared to admit as elements of theoretical, scientiﬁc ontologies.15 And
this is precisely the constitutive capacity in which naturalism seems to function.
As certain biological entities presuppose a naturalistic interpretive background
for their sense, it cannot be argued that such a background can simply be
empirically described, given that empirical conceptions of the way things are
presuppose rather than entail it. So, as naturalism is an a priori restriction that
determines the kinds of things that are admitted into being, it cannot itself be
legitimated via appeal to those very beings. Thus, in order to begin to consider
whether God is a plausible constituent of the evolutionary environment, one is
required to suspend acceptance of biological objectivities that have already been
constituted naturalistically, and contemplate the possibility of alternative inter-
pretive stances that integrate God as a possible experiential object and environ-
mental inﬂuence.
‘Methodological ’ naturalism ultimately amounts to an interpretive background
that determines the kinds of things one is prepared to admit as possible con-
stituents of reality. If this background is taken as an inﬂexible conception of what
the objective world can contain, then any conception of the world that involves
God as an active part of experienced reality is excluded. Thus, the naturalism in
question translates into a substantial ontological commitment that is antagon-
istic to a large body of religious doctrine. What’s more, it is arguably impossible to
refute empirically, as the possibility of any phenomenon that could possibly
refute it is denied. And this is because any biological phenomenon can in prin-
ciple be interpreted so as to ﬁt in with it if one tries hard enough. Consider
the following, where A presupposes an atheistic interpretive background and B
a theistic background:
(A) x is a malfunction of a structure A that performs y.
(B) A ordinarily performs y but it has also evolved the capacity for x,
which is the privilege of the spiritually enlightened.
(A) A used to have a function x but doesn’t any more.
(B) A is functional but not in our individualistic, atheistic society.
(A) A is a spandrel that resulted as a contingent consequence of B’s
development of function y.
(B) B’s y’ing only persists because it now supports A’s x’ing.
I suspect that these sorts of contrasting interpretations can be formulated in
relation to just about any biological phenomenon and that there is no wholly
The neurology of religious experience 341
empirical way of deciding between them, given that one’s understanding of what
the world contains is itself diﬀerently carved out by diﬀerent interpretive back-
grounds. What may look to someone like an adaptation for x can be reinterpreted
as a structural constraint by someone else who doesn’t want to ﬁnd an adaptation
for x. If it looks too intricate to be a structural constraint, various complex evol-
utionary contingencies can be invoked until the story starts to look plausible. It
is not possible to see functions, malfunctions, and contingent eﬀects in the bio-
logical world. They are interpretations that presuppose a view of how things are.
If these presuppositions are set in stone, then anything can be made to ﬁt in with
them.
To illustrate this point, consider an analogy. Gould and Lewontin famously
argued that the adaptationist programme prevalent in biology during the 1970s
amounted to a collection of ‘speculative tales’ (1979/1994, 73) . Every eﬀect of
every structure was assumed a priori to be an adaptation and all other alternatives
were implicitly ruled out. A story could always be strung together to support some
adaptationist interpretation; ‘since the range of adaptive stories is as wide as our
minds are fertile, new stories can always be postulated’ (1979/1994, 79). Thus,
according to Gould and Lewontin, adaptationist methodology amounted to a
self-perpetuating way of thinking that refused to entertain contrary possibilities.
I suggest that the same is true of naturalism, construed as an unwavering
commitment to what the world is like that determines the domain of acceptable
phenomena. Even though naturalistic explanations, unlike the adaptationism
satirized by Gould and Lewontin, incorporate all manner of diﬀerent evolutionary
explanations, naturalism places a limit on the range of acceptable phenomena
and it can reinterpret and accommodate anything that doesn’t at ﬁrst seem to ﬁt.
Thus naturalism constitutes a broader, more embracing narrative than adap-
tationism but, if held inﬂexibly, it amounts to dogmatic enforcement of a meta-
physical lens through which the world is interpreted. Gould and Lewontin list
four criteria for bad adaptationist story-telling (1979/1994, 79). Below I have listed
the ﬁrst three,16 replacing the word ‘adaptive’ with the term ‘naturalistic’. As you
can see, it works pretty well :
(1) If one [naturalistic] argument fails, try another.
(2) If one [naturalistic] argument fails, assume that another must exist ;
a weaker version of the ﬁrst argument.
(3) In the absence of a good [naturalistic] argument in the ﬁrst
place, attribute failure to imperfect understanding of where an
organism lives and what it does.
Naturalism is a constitutive commitment that delimits possible objects of in-
quiry. It is not itself empirically vindicated but, rather, has become a framework
for vindication. And if both theism and naturalism are taken to be inﬂexible, pre-
theoretical interpretive backgrounds, then the result, I suggest, is ontological
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and epistemological relativism. However, there is no in-principle reason why
a background of interpretation cannot be questioned. Why not see what happens
to your interpretations of the biological world when you lower the naturalistic
defences and entertain God as a possible constituent of the experienceable world?
Hence, anybody who does not explicitly admit to operating wholly from within a
metaphysically atheistic research framework should open up the arena of debate
to embrace the complex cycle of mutual illumination between empirical inves-
tigation of worldly entities and diﬀerent constitutive presuppositions concerning
what the world is like. I do not champion the claim that God really speaks to
people during religious experiences, and neither do I recommend the adoption of
a theistic interpretive framework over an atheistic one. But I do think that both
possibilities are worth investigating and that to do so will involve not merely
empirical work but also acknowledgement of the hermeneutic dimensions of
science, of how scientiﬁc ontologies are constituted by interpretive stances.17
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Notes
1. For two of the many reports, see Steve Connor ‘ ‘‘God spot’’ is found in brain’, Los Angeles Times,
29 October 1997 and Sunday Times, 2 November 1997; Robert Lee Holtz ‘Brain’s ‘‘God module’’ may
aﬀect religious intensity’, broadcast on BIC News, 31 October 1997.
2. As reported in Ramachandran et al. (1998), and Ramachandran and Blakeslee (1998).
3. Ramachandran cites Slater and Beard (1963), Dewhurst and Beard (1970) and Trimble (1992) amongst
others.
4. The reference cited is co-authored with Sandra Blakeslee. However, as the book is generally written
in the ﬁrst person singular, referring to work that Ramachandran has carried out, I refer exclusively to
Ramachandran when citing it in the text.
5. As the limbic system is involved with production and regulation of emotional responses, generally
enhanced activation of these pathways is likely to result in more pronounced emotional reactions
to all stimuli, which are consequently perceived by the subject as imbued with signiﬁcance.
6. Albright (2000) criticizes Ramachandran’s premature commitment to a specialized neural structure
that can be identiﬁed independent of a broader context of cortical activity. Albright emphasizes a more
holistic, developmental perspective on the brain, challenging the assumptions that it is comprised of
a ‘collection of unrelated modules’ and that experience of God can ‘be conﬁned to a single sort of
experience, or to a module of the brain’ (2000, 737).
7. It may however make more sense from a thoroughgoing pragmatist point of view.
8. See Ratcliﬀe (2002) for the view that emotions and moods are a pre-theoretical, world-disclosing cradle
within which explicit, propositional cognition rests, disclosing a sense of reality that is more basic than
the objective world that the sciences take for granted. See also Ratcliﬀe (forthcoming) for a discussion
of William James and the emotions.
9. Selectionist accounts of function are surprisingly technical, distinguishing between a variety of diﬀerent
scenarios in order to insulate themselves against counter-examples. See for instance the essays by
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Wright, Millikan, Neander, Griﬃths, Godfrey-Smith, and Kitcher in Allen, Beckoﬀ, and Lauder (eds)
(1998). I do not agree with any such account. However, for current purposes, I assume that ‘the function
of A is x ’ is generally coincident with some variant along the lines of ‘A exists/persists because of
selective factors favouring an ability to x ’.
10. Gould and Vrba (1982) refer to a structure that was originally adapted to perform task y but was
subsequently adapted for x and now performs x but not y as an exaptation. There are plenty of other,
similar terms referring to the same or similar historical scenarios ﬂoating around in the current
literature (e.g. Griﬃths (1992) discusses ‘exadaptation’). Gould and Vrba restrict the term ‘function’ to
the structure’s original role. However, it is more usual to regard the task that is currently the focus of
selection pressures as the structure’s function.
11. Explanations (2)–(5) can also be rephrased with A as part of B, as can (1)–(4) below.
12. This would be analogous to ‘the function of the heart (A) is to pump the blood (x) and the reason that x
is functional is that pumping the blood supplies the body with oxygen’.
13. As Dennett (1990, 188) puts it, ‘one starts oﬀ with a naive understanding of the ‘‘problem’’ faced by
some organism, and in terms of that naive understanding works out how the organism ought to be
designed’.
14. This is evident in the writings of evolutionary psychologists such as Cosmides and Tooby (1992), who
look at what the mind currently does in order to extrapolate about the nature selection pressures with
which we were confronted in the Pleistocene environment in which the mind evolved.
15. See e.g. Husserl’s (1970, Part 2) historical discussion of the origins of modern scientiﬁc objectivism.
According to Husserl, the sense of modern objectivism rests on a sedimented and forgotten history of
accomplishments, culminating in the achievements of Galileo and Descartes. These accomplishments
take the form of methodological innovations, which at the same time constitute their objects of study.
All draw their sense from the tacit, pre-given life-world.
16. The fourth criterion, ‘emphasize immediate utility and exclude other attributes of form’, cannot be
made to apply here.
17. I am grateful to Brian Garvey, Joan McCarthy, Norman Sieroka, and an audience at the University of
Ulster, Coleraine for helpful comments on an earlier version of this article.
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